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As state and local governments have devoted a rising share of their resources to 
crime-related programmes, concerns have arisen that spending on other programmes 
such as education will fall. Coupledwith growing public concerns over performance of 
the public education system, and expectations that prison populations will rise as 
states pass and enforce more stringent sentencing laws, it is not surprising that some 
view the expansion of crime-related programmes as troublesome. One hypothesis is 
that education and crime-related programmes directly compete for government ex­
penditures so that what one programme gains the other must lose as in a ® xed-pie 
situation. A competing hypothesis is that spending on these two public programmes 
are unrelated and therefore higher crime-related spending may also lead to higher 
taxes or public debt issuance, or to reduction in spending on programmes other than 
education. We estimate a three equation model of spending on crime-related pro­
grammes, spending on education, and the crime rate from which we directly test 
whether spending on crime and education in¯ uence each other. 
I . INTRODUCTION who were awaiting trial or serving a sentence at mid-year 
1995. 
Government spending on crime-related programmes and Public spending on education is another area that at-
law enforcement has received growing and considerable tracts considerable public attention. When compared to 
public attention in recent years. According to recent other industrialized economies, US schools appear to per­
Department of Justice reports,1 three cents of every govern- form poorly, and a common perception is that conditions 
ment dollar in ® scal year 1990 went for justice activities, are worsening over time.2 It is often argued that spending 
including police protection, jails and prisons, and the courts. has declined, but public education spending (1989± 90 dol­
Most dollars are spent by state and local governments as lars) per pupil rose 74% from 1960 to 1992, or from roughly 
they accounted for 87% of total (federal, state and local) US $2979 to $5196.3 At the same time, and despite this 
expenditures of US $74 billion for civil and criminal justice spending increase, combined SAT (Student Achievement 
in ® scal year 1990, a 22% increase over 1988. On a per Test) scores fell 5.2%, or from 948 to 899 over this same 
capita basis, the three levels of government together spent period.4 Despite the spending expansion, growing support 
US $299. By year-end 1995, 5.3 million people were on for further expansion of education spending is advocated by 
probation, in jail or prison, or on parole ± nearly 2.8%of all those who believe that spending expansion is necessary 
US adult residents ± and state and federal prisons held 1.1 if the purported decline in student performance is to be 
million prisoners. Local jails held another 507044 adults reversed.5 
1 Statistics reported here are from Bureau of Justice Statistics, Expenditure and Employment Statistics, 1997.
 
2 See Peltzman (1993)
 
3Statistical Abstract of the United States (1993) Tables 221 and 222.
 
4Statistical Abstract of the United States (1993) Tables 265.
 
5 There is also growing support for other means of providing services such as charter schools and vouchers systems that allow greater
 
school choice for parents.
 
Given the desire to expand education spending, it is not 
surprising that its proponents view the expansion of crime­
related government spending as troublesome, either because 
they believe that it siphons o� dollars that could be used for 
education, or because of the view that fewer dollars spent on 
education today lead to greater expenditures on crime­
related programmes tomorrowas less-educated students are 
more likely to become criminals in the future. For example, 
passage in California of t`hree strikes and you are out’ 
legislation has led some educators and parents to fear that, 
as it leads to higher crime-related expenditures ± especially 
those related to incarceration of criminals ± a continual and 
rapid diminution of expenditures on education will follow. 
A recent study by the Rand Corporation (Greenwood et al., 
1994) predicts that California’ s t`hree strikes’ law carries 
a price tag of US $5.5 billion more in public spending on 
crime-related programmes. With more states taking a less 
lax attitude towards parole, and with more states consider­
ing legislation similar to California’ s t`hree strikes’ law, it 
appears that many states will witness growing commitments 
towards funding of crime-related programmes. 
This paper examines the relationship between public 
spending on education and public spending on crime­
related programmes. As just discussed, it is often alleged, at 
least at the state and local government level, that education 
and crime-related programmes directly compete for govern­
ment expenditures so that what one programme gains the 
other must lose as in a ® xed-pie situation. Higher expendi­
tures on crime-related programmes are therefore asserted 
to reduce, or crowd-out, expenditures on education. Of 
course, this is one hypothesis and a competing hypothesis is 
that spending on these two public programmes is unrelated 
and therefore higher crime-related spending may also lead 
to higher taxes to public debt issuance, or to reduction in 
spending on non-crime-related programmes. This paper 
examines whether state and local expenditures on crime­
related programmes crowd-out state and local expenditures 
on education. We estimate a three equationmodel of spend­
ing on crime-related programmes, spending on education, 
and the crime rate from which we directly test whether 
spending on crime and education in¯ uence each other. 
II . PREVIOUS STUDIES 
There has been little research conducted in the area of 
crowding-out among programmes of state and local govern­
ments. A review of this literature indicates that little or no 
evidence has been found to suggest any support for the 
hypothesis that higher crime-related funding, or funding of 
any programme for that matter, crowds-out funding on 
education. 
Brazer and McCarty (1987) test the m`unicipal overbur­
den’ hypothesis that high demand for municipal services 
lowers the demand for public elementary and secondary 
education. This hypothesis suggests that those areas, pri­
marily urban, that require relatively higher expenditures 
directed towards dealing with poverty, aged housing, and 
crime will have fewer resources available for education 
funding. The authors concluded that empirical evidence 
o� ers no support for the `municipal overburden’ hypothesis 
in the cases of per pupil funding among school districts in 
Connecticut, New Jersey, and Virginia during 1981± 82. 
However, they do ® nd several cases where a positive cor­
relation exists between municipal and education spending, 
which is in the opposite direction to that predicted by the 
m`unicipal overburden’ hypothesis. 
Fossett and Wycko� (1996) examine the impact of rising 
Medicaid spending on public elementary and secondary 
education spending. Using a two-stage, least squares ® xed 
e� ects model, they test the hypothesis on data from 47 states 
from 1980 to 1990. While an inverse relationship is esti­
mated, it is not statistically signi® cant and therefore the 
authors conclude that there is no support for the hypothesis. 
McCarty and Schmidt (1997) examine interactions 
among six spending programmes of state governments for 
evidence of crowding-out over eleven years, 1984± 94. The 
six programmes are elementary and secondary education, 
higher education, welfare, health and hospitals, corrections, 
and miscellaneous. They use a vector autoregression (VAR) 
model to examine whether changes in one programme are 
correlated with changes in other programmes, either over 
time or contemporaneously. No evidence of crowding-out is 
found. In most cases, when the programme’s funding rises 
above-trend, it has no signi® cant in¯ uence on future spend­
ing on other programmes. However, they found evidence 
that deviations from trend have signi® cant in¯ uences on 
future own-programme spending which they interpret to 
indicate that higher above-trend spending in one pro­
gramme is funded through higher tax revenues than 
through spending reduction in other programmes. 
There is a literature that examines how incarceration 
a� ects the crime rate and ultimately expenditures on 
prisons. Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesize that increases in 
lengths of prison terms cause the demand for prison space to 
grow at a diminishing rate as criminals react to longer 
expected sentence lengths by committing fewer crimes. In 
other words, the deterrence e� ects of longer sentences are 
assumed to more than outweigh longer prison terms thus 
leading to an overall reduction in demand for prison space. 
An implication of the Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesis is 
that voters and policymakers who push for shorter prison 
sentences and resist expanding current prison space as 
means of lowering costs are actually causing greater incen­
tives for criminal activity that ultimately lead to higher 
future costs as these policies lead to greater numbers of 
prisoners in the future. Cloninger (1996) argues that the 
Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesis rests on several assump­
tions that may be questionable, at least in the short-run, 
and suggests that e� ects of prison sentencing policies on 
demands for prison space are somewhat ambiguous. 
Clearly, this issue is extremely important when we consider 
that spending on prisons today have budgetary implications 
about spending on prisons tomorrow when such spending 
exerts signi® cant deterrence e� ects on criminal activity. We 
address this issue in our model by examining whether past 
changes in crime-related spending exert e� ects on crime 
rates over time.6 
Another related issue is developed in Brumm and 
Cloninger (1995) which examines whether there is a direct 
correlation between the w`ar on drugs’ and the homicide 
rate based on the hypothesis that the war on illicit drugs has 
diverted resources away from other law enforcement activ­
ities. If this is correct, Brumm and Cloninger (1995) predict 
that crime rates on non-drug-related activities are higher 
than they would otherwise be as the deterrence e� ect from 
law enforcement su� ers under reduced funding. Empirical 
evidence is reported that is consistent with the hypothesis 
that homicide rates are higher in communities that allocate 
relatively high percentages of law enforcement expenditures 
in the area of drug enforcement. This issue is important for 
our paper because it suggests that crowding-out of govern­
ment programmes may arise both between di� erent pro­
gramme categories (e.g., crime-related vs education vs mili­
tary) and within speci® c programmes (e.g., corrections vs 
law enforcement vs anti-crime advertising). In the area of 
crime, there are many di� erent subprogrammes and it is 
possible that one subprogramme such as corrections might 
crowd-out another subprogramme such as law enforcement. 
As just discussed, such an allocation may have implications 
for future spending when, for instance, fewer dollars allo­
cated to law enforcement today leads to greater incentives 
for criminal activity that ultimately lead to more prisoners, 
and therefore prison space, in the future. We address this 
issue by separately examining total crime-related spending 
and corrections spending and therefore test whether these 
two types of crime-related spending exert di� erential e� ects 
on both crime rates and on education spending. 
III. EDUCATION AND CRIME-RELATED 
SPENDING EQUATIONS 
Education and crime-related expenditures are determined 
through the political process between voters and policy 
makers, within the budget (spending, tax, and debt) institu­
tions of state and local governments. Within the budget 
processes of governments, education and crime-related ex­
penditures are determined, along with expenditures in other 
budget categories. The total budget is then the sum of its 
component parts, where various demographic (e.g., age dis­
tribution), economic (e.g. unemployment rates), and cultural 
(e.g., past crime rates) characteristics then in¯ uence demand 
for individual spending programmes. 
The following models of cross-state education and crime­
related spending are estimated: 
EDEXPi = f (CRIMEi , Y i , EDUCi , DENSIT Y i , 
STUDENT i , ST AT Ei , FEDi , SCHOOL Si , 
DIV ERSIT Yi ) (1) 
CRIMEi = f (EDEXPi , CRi , CCRi , DOMi) (2) 
CRi = f (CRIMEi , DIV ERSIT Y i , CRi ± 1 , Yi , 
MEDAGEi , MID1i , MID2i , UEi , CUEi ) (3) 
See Table 1 for a description of the variables, andTable 2 for 
summary statistics of key variables. Per capita crime-related 
spending in 1992 averaged US$273.63, with a low of 
US$117.52 (West Virginia), and a high of US$571.60 
(Alaska). Per capita crime-related spending in 1985 aver­
aged US$155.41, with a low of US$82.16 (West Virginia), 
and a high of US$592.04 (Alaska). Education spending per 
pupil in 1992 averaged US$5497.40, with a low of 
US$3180.20 (Utah), and a high of US$9415.20 (New Jersey). 
Education spending per pupil in 1985 averaged US$4369, 
with a low of US$2756 (Mississippi), and a high of US$9689 
(Alaska). The crime rate, as measured by crime o� ences 
(violent plus property) known to police per 100 000 popula­
tion in 1992 averaged 5085 with a low of 2610 (West Vir­
ginia) and a high of 8358 (Florida). In 1985, the crime rate 
averaged 4753, with a low of 2253 (West Virginia) and 
a high of 7574 (Florida). 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variables are educational expenditures 
EDEXPi , crime expenditures CRIMEi , and the crime rate 
CRi .7 The model is estimated twice, one for each of two 
years 1992 and 1985. These two years are chosen because 
they represent the longest time period for which consistent 
data on crime-related programmes is available. 
Educational spending equation 
Crime-related spending is included in the education 
spending equation to test the hypothesis that the two are 
intertwined in the public budget. A negative relation would 
6 See Buck (1996) and Smith (1996) for further appraisals of the Clark and Lee (1996) hypothesis. 
7Notice that the connection between education spending and programme quality is ambiguous, as higher education spending could simply 
re¯ ect higher compensation for school personnel or it could also re¯ ect higher quality programmes. However, for our purposes, we are 
only interested in education spending because this appears to be the focus of the crime-education debate. See Marlow (1997) for 
a discussion of how numbers of schools in¯ uence education spending and student achievement. 
Table 1. De® nitions 
EDEXPi	 Current expenditures for public elementary and secondary education, per pupil. 
CRIMEi	 Total crime-related expenditures of state and local governments, per pupil. Includes expenditures for police 
protection, judicial, legal services and prosecution, public defence expenditure, corrections expenditure, and 
other justice expenditure. 
Yi	 Median family income of the population 
EDUCi	 Percentage of population with high school degrees 
DENSIT Y i	 Percentage of population living in metropolitan areas 
STUDENT i	 Elementary and secondary student percentage of population 
ST AT Ei	 Percentage of education funding from state government 
FEDi	 Percentage of education funding from federal government 
SCHOOL Si	 Number of schools per 1000 students 
DIVi	 Index of racial/ethnic diversity; the higher the value, the less diverse the population 
CRi	 Crime o� ences known to police per 100000 population; includes both violent and property crime 
CCRi	 Change in crime rate (three-year change) 
MEDAGEi	 Median age of population 
MID1i	 Percentage of population aged 18 ± 24 
MID2i	 Percentage of population aged 25 ± 44 
DOMi	 Percentage of justice-related employees in population, includes police protection, judicial , legal services and 
prosecution, public defence, corrections, and other justice employees. 
UEi	 Civilian unemployment rate 
CUEi	 Change in civilian unemployment rate, (three year change) 
suggest that higher crime-related spending crowds-out edu­
cation spending. A positive relation would suggest that 
higher spending on crime-related programmes leads to 
higher spending on education, or that states that allocate 
relatively many resources to crime-related programmes also 
allocate relatively many resources to education pro­
grammes. No relationship would suggest no linkage be­
tween the two spending programmes in the public budget. 
The median voter theorem predicts that median voters 
dominate spending decisions. Median family income Yi is 
therefore hypothesized to be positively related to education 
spending. Higher educated voter are hypothesized to vote 
for more education and therefore a positive coe� cient is 
hypothesized for EDUCi , percentage of population with 
high school degrees. Population density DENSIT Y i 
measures the percentage of the population living in metro­
politan areas and, because production costs are commonly 
believed to be higher in metropolitan areas, it is hy­
pothesized to be positively related to education spending. 
The student percentage of the population STUDENT i con­
trols for cross-state di� erences in student populations and is 
hypothesized to exert positive in¯ uences on education 
spending because higher values may re¯ ect greater parental 
demands for education. 
The state share of education funding ST AT Ei , controls 
for the Brennan and Buchanan (1980) hypothesis that more 
centralized funding leads to the perception by taxpayers 
that local funding burdens are lower than under less central­
ized funding.8 That is, the lower the cost of education 
perceived by taxpayers, the greater the demand for public 
education. A positive e� ect from the state share of funding is 
therefore hypothesized.9 The federal share of education 
funding FEDi is hypothesized to exert similar in¯ uences on 
public education spending; i.e., a higher value of FEDi leads 
to higher education spending if the cost perceived by state 
and local taxpayers falls. 
The relationship between numbers of schools and educa­
tional expenditures is theoretically indeterminate. Substan­
tial economies of scale could be unexploited when there are 
relatively many schools so that a greater number of schools 
is associated with higher expenditures. But, a large number 
of schools could also be an indication of vigorous competi­
tion among governments, or school districts, with educa­
tional services delivered at low cost.1 0 The Leviathanmodel 
8Winer (1983) and Logan (1986) argue that higher values of grants lower ® nancing burdens, as perceived by taxpayers, and leads to higher 
overall government spending. 
9Moreover, if higher values of ST AT Ei lead to greater spending equalization among schools and school districts, then there may also be 
fewer quality di� erences within a state’s public education system and therefore fewer potential gains that parents may experience by 
relocating to another school district or school within a state. Because greater equalization lowers the gains to exiting, or in the Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980) view lowers the level of intergovernmental competition, this is hypothesized to lead to higher spending as well. 
1 0There is some evidence that past school district consolidation has not exploited scale economies. Kenny and Schmidt (1994) ® nd that 
numbers of school districts in states are always substantially greater than numbers that would be predicted based solely on attempts to 
gain greater scale economies. 
Table 2. Summary statistics of key variables 
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
1992 
Crime-related spending (per capita) 
Corrections spending (per capita) 
Primary and secondary education spending (per pupil) 
Crime rate 
Median household income 
Per cent of population with High School Degree or 
Higher, 1990 
Per cent of population in metropolitan areas 
Student share of population 
Number of schools per 1000 students 
State share of education funding 
Federal share of education funding 
Diversity index 
Median age of population 
Population share aged 18 ± 24 
Population share aged 25 ± 44 
Crime employees as share of population 
Correctional employees as share of population 
1985 
Crime-related spending (per capita) 
Corrections spending (per capita) 
Primary and secondary education spending (per pupil) 
Crime rate 
Median household income 
Per cent of population with High School Degree or 
Higher, 1980 
Per cent of population in metropolitan areas 
Student share of population 
Numbers of schools per 1000 students 
State share of education funding 
Federal share of education funding 
Diversity index 
Median age of population 
Population share aged 18 ± 24 
Population share aged 25 ± 44 
Crime employees as share of population 
Correctional employees as share population 
273.63 
96.52 
5497.4 
5085 
30 720 
76.3 
66.7 
17.45 
2.47 
49.0 
7.0 
6930 
33.5 
10.13 
31.88 
0.56 
0.19 
155.41 
47.86 
4369 
4753 
32 877 
67.5 
63.4 
19.25 
2.32 
49.78 
6.86 
7247 
31.1 
12.1 
30.7 
0.50 
0.14 
259.30 
90.45 
5340.3 
5081 
30278 
76.8 
69.6 
17.44 
2.11 
47.6 
6.2 
7026 
33.6 
10.05 
31.78 
0.55 
0.18 
136.86 
41.68 
41.26 
4627 
32339 
68.0 
66.4 
19.99 
1.85 
47.71 
6.43 
7314 
31.2 
12.1 
30.5 
0.46 
0.13 
117.52 
32.28 
3180.2 
2610 
42 171 
64.3 
24 
14.3 
1.27 
8.5 
3.6 
3864 
26.6 
8.82 
28.80 
0.34 
0.08 
82.16 
17.38 
2756 
2253 
22 638 
53.1 
19.1 
15.85 
1.17 
8.11 
2.93 
4134 
25.4 
10.4 
27.1 
0.34 
0.07 
571.60 
224.83 
9415.2 
8358 
20 301 
86.6 
100 
25.6 
5.61 
90.6 
16.4 
9624 
36.6 
11.74 
37.64 
0.85 
0.33 
592.04 
234.11 
9689 
7574 
49 264 
82.5 
100 
25.47 
5.61 
90.86 
17.83 
9681 
35.5 
13.3 
38.9 
0.80 
0.25 
of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) would predict that fewer 
schools lead to higher education spending because this 
re¯ ects less intergovernmental competition in the public 
education market. The hypothesized sign on SCHOOL Si , 
numbers of schools per 1000 students, is therefore an em­
pirical question.1 1 
The ethnic diversity of a state’s population DIV i is ex­
pected to be positively related to educational expenditures. 
An ethnically diverse population often requires special 
education programmes that increase expenditures per pupil. 
An index of diversity was created for each state using 
race/ethnic groups reported by the Census Bureau: White-
Hispanic, Black-Hispanic, American Indian, Eskimo, 
Aleut-Hispanic, Asian Paci® c Islander-Hispanic, White 
non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, Aleut non-Hispanic and 
Asian Paci® c Islander non-Hispanic. The diversity index 
was calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of the 
population of each group. The greater is the diversity index, 
1 1An alternative measure, numbers of school districts per 1000 students, was also used, but because it yielded results very similar to 
numbers of schools per 1000 students, estimations using this measure are not shown here. 
the less racially/ethnically diverse is a state’s population. 
A negative e� ect, or a more diverse population leads to 
greater expenditures, is therefore hypothesized. 
Crime spending equation 
Equation spending is included in the crime spending equa­
tion to test the hypothesis that the two are interrelated in 
the public budget. A negative relation would suggest that 
higher education spending crowds-out crime spending. 
A positive relation would suggest that higher spending on 
education leads to higher spending on crime, or that b`ig’ 
spenders on crime are also b`ig’ spenders on education. No 
relationship would suggest no linkage between the two 
programmes. 
The crime rate CRi , and its change over the previous 
three years CCRi , are hypothesized to exert positive in¯ uen­
ces on crime spending.Higher crime rates, and higher recent 
increases in crime rates, are expected to raise crime-related 
spending as more resources are devoted to enforcement, 
court costs, incarceration, and prevention areas of public 
spending. As crime rates rise, the public may also demand 
higher expenditures, and given criminal codes and sentenc­
ing policies, greater crime activity results in higher public 
crime-related expenditures. 
The dominance of crime-related employees in the popula­
tion DOMi controls for two possible e� ects on spending. 
First, the simple fact that there are relatively more em­
ployees should lead to higher payrolls, and therefore spend­
ing as well. Second, crime-related employees are a special 
interest group with an interest in promoting spending on 
crime programmes, and therefore they will exert a stronger 
force on the political process that determines public budget­
ing. Because, in both cases, a positive in¯ uence from DOMi 
is hypothesized, higher shares of crime-related employees is 
hypothesized to lead to higher spending on crime pro­
grammes. While the average per cent of crime-related 
employees in the population is 0.56, it has a fairly large 
range running from a high of 0.85 (New York) to a low of 
0.34 (West Virginia) in 1992.1 2 
Crime rate equation 
Following the logic that crime-related spending deters 
criminal activity, the contemporaneous level of crime­
related spending is hypothesized to exert a negative in¯ uence 
on the crime rate. The ethnic diversity of a state’s popula­
tion DIVi is hypothesized to in¯ uence crime rates, based on 
the expectation that an ethnically diverse population creates 
greater cultural con¯ icts and tensions that result in higher 
crime rates. The previous year’s crime rate, CRi ± 1 , is 
expected to exert a positive in¯ uence on the crime rate. 
Median income is hypothesized to exert a negative in¯ uence 
on the crime rate based on the economic argument that 
individuals ® nd criminal activity more attractive as their 
(legal) opportunities to earn income fall. 
We hypothesize that the more youthful the population, 
the higher are crime rates because a disproportionate share 
of crimes is committed by juveniles and young adults. The 
following population variables are included: MID1i is per­
centage of population aged 18 ± 24, andMID2i is percentage 
of population aged 25 ± 44. Higher values of both variables 
are expected to raise crime rates because a majority of 
crimes are committed within these age brackets. Median 
age, MEDAGEi , is used to control for di� erences in median 
ages across the states. 
The civilian unemployment rate UEi is hypothesized to 
be positively related to crime rates because, in those states 
with relatively fewer jobs, there may be a greater incentive 
for criminal activity. The three-year change in the unem­
ployment rate CUEi is hypothesized to exert a positive 
in¯ uence on crime rates because, the higher a recent increase 
in unemployment, the greater the incentive for criminal 
activity. Use of CUEi also controls for the fact that some 
states have persistently high or low unemployment rates, as 
in¯ uenced by geographic or industrial characteristics, and 
therefore the very fact that a state has a relatively high 
unemployment rate does not necessarily always suggest the 
same event when some states have persistently high unem­
ployment rates and others have high unemployment rates 
that are more transitory in nature. 
We included the probability of arrest in our crime rate 
equations based on the hypothesis that higher values of this 
variable lead to lower crime rates as expected punishment 
from committing crimes is perceived to be higher by poten­
tial criminals. For each state, Crime in the United States: 
Uniform Crime Reports provides number of crimes and the 
crime rate per 100000 inhabitants and from these numbers 
we constructed the probability of arrest. Estimations found 
that this variable was never statistically signi® cant and 
therefore we do not show these runs here as its inclusion 
into our model never changed the signi® cance or sign of the 
other independent variables. Perhaps lack of signi® cance is 
a result of having already captured this variable in our 
lagged crime rate variable. 
IV. ESTIMATION OF CRIME AND 
EDUCATION SPENDING EQUATIONS 
The two stage least squares (TSLS) technique is used to 
estimate the model because the education and crime-related 
1 2These numbers correspond to percentages of population, while those used in the regressions are shares of the population; i.e., percentages 
were derived by multiplying the shares by 100. 
spending equations each contain dependent variables as 
right-hand-side variables. Estimation using ordinary least 
squares (OLS) is inappropriate for a system of equations 
that contain interrelationships between sets of variables. 
We estimate equations for 1992 and 1985, using i = 1, 
2, ¼ 50 states. Signi® cance of estimated coe� cients is based 
on two-tailed tests at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Data for 
EDEXPi , STUDENT i , ST AT Ei , FEDi , SCHOOL Si are 
obtained from theDigest of Education Statistics (1992, 1993). 
Data for Y i , EDUCi , DENSIT Yi , CRi , CCRi , UEi , and 
CUEi are obtained from the Statistical Abstract of the 
United States (various years). Data for CRIMEi and DOMi 
are obtained from Table 9 of Justice Expenditure and Em­
ployment in the US, 1988 and 1992. Data on MEDAGEi , 
MID1i , MID2i , and DIV ERSIT Yi are obtained from US 
Census, Population Estimates. 
Table 3 displays TSLS estimates of our three equation 
model using 1992 and 1985 data. Let us discuss the ® rst 
three columns which display the estimates of education 
spending, crime spending, and the crime rate in 1992. In 
both cases of public spending equations, spending on one 
programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯ uence on spend­
ing on the other programme. That is, spending on crime is 
found to positively in¯ uence education spending, and 
spending on education is found to positively in¯ uence 
spending on crime. Contrary to claims of those who believe 
that spending on crime-related programmes crowds-out 
education spending, the in¯ uences are positive, not negative. 
In the education spending equation, signi® cant in¯ uences 
are crime-related spending (positive), income (positive, as 
hypothesized), education (negative, contrary to expecta­
tions), federal share of spending (negative), and numbers of 
schools (positive). In the case of the crime spending equa­
tion, signi® cant in¯ uences are education spending (positive), 
the contemporaneous crime rate (positive, as hypothesized), 
and employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Es­
timation of the crime rate equation indicates the following 
signi® cant in¯ uences: previous year’s crime rates (positive, 
as hypothesized) and the percentage of the population aged 
18 ± 24 (negative, contrary to expectations). 
We now discuss the last three columns of Table 3 which 
display equation estimates for 1985. As in 1992, spending on 
one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯ uence on 
spending on the other programme. In the education spend­
ing equation, signi® cant in¯ uences are crime-related spend­
ing (positive), education (negative, contrary to expectations), 
and student share of the population (negative). The negative 
sign on student share of the population might arise when 
states that experience relatively high student-population 
growth ® nd it more di� cult to maintain, or increase, fund­
ing per student. For example, if it takes several years for 
spending to c`atch-up’ with student-population increase, the 
short-term relationship between student-population and 
education spending per pupil might be negative.1 3 In the 
case of crime spending, signi® cant in¯ uences are education 
spending (positive) and employee dominance (positive, as 
hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate equation indi­
cates the following signi® cant in¯ uences: crime spending 
(negative), the previous year’s crime rate (positive), the con­
temporaneous unemployment rate (negative), and the 
change in the unemployment rate (positive). The negative 
sign on the contemporaneous unemployment rate may sim­
ply indicate that, after controlling for other factors which 
in¯ uence crime rates, states with higher unemployment 
rates had lower crime rates. The same is true for the unex­
pected inverse relationship between the crime rate in 1992 
and the percentage of the population aged 18 ± 24. After 
controlling for other factors, we ® nd that states with larger 
percentages of their population composed of individuals 
aged 18 ± 24 had lower crime rates in 1992. Perhaps this 
indicates that there was an e� ective nationwide e� ort to 
reduce crimes committed by youth, as when police depart­
ments across the country might have instituted programmes 
directed toward reducing crimes in this age group. Or, it 
could be that individuals in the 18 ± 24 age group have a low 
propensity to report crimes, so not as many crimes become 
know to the authorities. 
V. ESTIMATION OF CORRECTIONS AND 
EDUCATION SPENDING EQUATIONS 
Because the argument that crime-related spending crowds-
out education spending often appears to be based on the 
recent growth in prisons and inmates, we now estimate our 
model with spending on corrections as a replacement for 
total crime-related spending. Measured on a per capita 
basis, correctional spending allows us to consider whether 
this particular area of crime spending crowds-out school 
spending, an argument often made in California. 
Spending on corrections is a considerable and growing 
portion of total spending on crime-related programmes, and 
one whose magnitude varies widely across the states. While 
mean levels of total crime-related spending per capita are 
US$273.63 (1992) and US$155.41 (1985), mean levels of 
correctional spending per capita are US$96.52 (1992) and 
US$47.86 (1985). Therefore, mean percentages of total 
crime-related spending allocated to corrections are 35% 
(1992) and 31% (1985). The range of correctional spending 
in 1992 is US$224.83 (Alaska) ± US$32.28 (West Virginia); 
and for 1985 the range is US$234.11 (Alaska) ± $17.38 
(West Virginia). 
1 3This has been suggested to be a major reason for why per pupil increases in education funding in California have often lagged those of 
other states. That is, with relatively high gains in student population, it has taken California longer to catch-up with those states that 
experienced relatively low gains in student populations. 
Table 3. T SL S estimations of public primary and secondary education spending, total crime spending, and crime rate equations, 1992 
and 1985 
1992 1985 
Education Crime Education Crime 
spending spending spending spending 
(US$ per (US$ per Crime (US$ per (US$ per Crime 
Variable pupil) capita) rate pupil) capita) rate 
Constant 10 121.6a - 0.23a 5139.2c 4973.5b - 16.1a 2149.4 
(3.41) (4.90) (1.80) (2.58) (6.4) (1.37) 
Crime spending 10.4a - 211.9 10.9a - 1.68b 
(4.01) (0.17) (6.31) (2.13) 
Education spending 0.03a 0.05a 
(4.56) (6.09) 
Income 0.11a - 0.01 0.03 - 0.007 
(2.74) (0.71) (1.41) (0.77) 
Education - 121.79b - 28.3b 
(2.59) (2.09) 
Metro - 5.21 - 3.85 
(0.45) (0.59) 
Student - 116.78 - 117.5b 
(1.26) (2.22) 
State - 12.96 - 2.44 
(1.40) (0.45) 
Federal - 143.62c - 70.3 
(1.69) (1.50) 
Schools 46 296.2b 88 081.9 
(2.31) (0.82) 
Diversity 0.20 - 0.04 0.12 - 0.02 
(1.33) (1.03) (1.38) (0.80) 
Crime rate 3.13E-05a 0.007 
(contemporaneous) (3.10) (1.22) 
Crime rate (1 year lag) 0.90a 1.11a 
(17.7) (28.3) 
Crime rate change 1.03E-05 0.008 
(three-year) (0.52) (0.55) 
Median age - 61.5 - 18.9 
(1.41) (0.86) 
Pop 18 ± 24 - 200.0c - 86.5 
(1.85) (1.43) 
Pop 25 ± 44 1.51 4.06 
(0.04) (0.17) 
Employee dominance 26778.0b 24673.7a 
(2.30) (2.90) 
Unemployment rate 3.26 - 34.59c 
(0.08) (1.73) 
Change in unemployment - 19.93 36.96c 
rate (three-year) (0.32) (1.69) 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.73 0.95 0.79 0.78 0.96 
SEE 761.9 0.05 268.2 466.0 36.1 201.2 
F 12.0a 33.8a 108.1a 20.7a 42.8a 220.5a 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, csigni® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
Table 4 displays the TSLS estimates of spending on state 
and local education and correctional programmes, and the 
crime rate. The ® rst three columns show the estimates for 
1992. In both cases of public spending equations, spending 
on one programme exerts a signi® cant positive in¯ uence on 
spending on the other programme. That is, spending on 
corrections is found to positively in¯ uence education spend­
ing, and spending on education is found to positively in¯ u­
ence spending on corrections. In the education spending 
equation, signi® cant in¯ uences are crime-related spending 
(positive), income (positive, as hypothesized), education 
(negative, contrary to expectations), and numbers of schools 
(positive). The results indicate an inverse relationship be­
tween education spending per pupil and the percentage of 
the population with at least a high school degree. A possible 
explanation for this is that parents without a high school 
degree realize how important a degree is, and are willing to 
support increased levels of spending to improve the educa­
tional success of their o� spring. 
In the case of the corrections spending equation, signi® ­
cant in¯ uences are education spending (positive), the con­
temporaneous crime rate (positive, as hypothesized), and 
employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). Estimation 
of the crime rate equation indicates the following signi® cant 
in¯ uences: previous year’s crime rates (positive, as hy­
pothesized) and the percentage of the population aged 
18 ± 24 (negative, contrary to expectations). 
The last three columns of Table 4 display equation esti­
mates for 1985. As in 1992, spending on one programme 
exerts a signi® cant positive in¯ uence on spending on the 
other programme. In the education spending equation, sig­
ni® cant in¯ uences are crime-related spending (positive), 
income (positive, as hypothesized), student share of the 
population (negative), and the federal share of funding 
(negative). As previously suggested, the negative sign on 
student share of the populationmight arise when states that 
experience relatively high student-population growth ® nd it 
more di� cult to maintain, or increase, funding per student. 
In the corrections spending equation, signi® cant in¯ uences 
are education spending (positive) and employee dominance 
(positive, as hypothesized). Estimation of the crime rate 
equation indicates the following signi® cant in¯ uences: cor­
rections spending (negative, as hypothesized), the previous 
year’s crime rate (positive), and the change in the unemploy­
ment rate (positive). 
VI . ESTIMATIONS USING PERCENTAGE 
CHANGES OVER 1995 ± 1988 
Table 5 displays estimates of spending and crime rate equa­
tions where these variables are measured as percentage 
changes over 1992± 1985. These equations were estimated in 
order to determine how changes in these variables over this 
time period in¯ uenced one another. As with the dependent 
variables, we also calculated percentage changes in all ex­
planatory variables. These models are another approach to 
determining whether crime-related spending crowded-out 
spending on education over this period. 
The ® rst three columns display estimations of percentage 
changes in education spending per pupil, total crime-
related spending, and the crime rate. Estimations of 
these relationships mirror the results from our previous 
estimations that focused on single-year relationships. That 
is, each programme exerts a positive in¯ uence on the other 
over this time period. Therefore, there is no evidence that 
either programme crowded-out the other over this time 
frame. 
In the education spending equation, signi® cant in¯ uences 
are crime-related spending (positive), student-share of the 
population (negative), and diversity (positive, contrary to 
expectations). In the equations for the percentage change in 
education spending per pupil between 1992 and 1985, the 
diversity variable is positive and we hypothesized a negative 
sign. The positive relationship between the diversity vari­
able and expenditure per pupil means that those states 
whose populations became more racial/ethnically homo­
geneous had the greatest percentage increases in expendi­
ture per pupil. This may suggest that individuals prefer to 
locate in homogeneous communities, and when the com­
munity makeup changes towards the preferred homogene­
ous one, they are willing to increase spending on their 
children’s education. Also, it could be that greater 
racial/ethnic diversity among the population gives rise to 
demands for a greater variety of public expenditure pro­
grammes, and with a greater variety of public expenditure 
programmes there is less expenditure per programme, in­
cluding education. 
In the crime spending equation, signi® cant in¯ uences are 
education spending (positive) and crime-related employees 
as a share of the population (positive, as hypothesized). In 
the crime rate equation, signi® cant in¯ uences are the lagged 
crime rate (positive) and median age of the population 
(positive). Interestingly, the percentage change in total 
crime-related spending does not exert a statistically signi® ­
cant in¯ uence on the percentage change in the crime rate 
over this period. 
The last three columns display estimations of percentage 
changes in education spending per pupil, correctional 
spending per capita, and the crime rate. While both spend­
ing programmes are found to exert positive in¯ uences on 
each other, only one programme (corrections) is estimated 
to exert a statistically signi® cant in¯ uence on the other 
programme (education). In the education spending equa­
tion, signi® cant in¯ uences are corrections (positive), student 
share of the population (negative), federal share of funding 
(negative), and diversity (positive, contrary to expectations). 
In the correctional spending equation, the only signi® cant 
in¯ uence is employee dominance (positive, as hypothesized). 
Estimation of the crime rate equation reveals the lagged 
Table 4. T SL S estimation of public primary and secondary education spending, corrections spending, and crime rate equations, 1992 
and 1985 
1992 1985 
Education Crime Education Corrections 
spending spending spending spending 
(US$ per (US$ per Crime (US$ per (US$ per Crime 
Variable pupil) capita) rate pupil) capita) rate 
Constant 49 469.6a - 0.11a 5223.7c 5696.4b - 68.97a 2072.1 
(2.96) (4.97) (1.97) (2.62) (5.58) (1.28) 
Corrections spending 14.09b - 1259.4 18.54a - 3.39c 
(2.70) (0.56) (4.02) (1.75) 
Education spending 0.02a 0.02a 
(5.46) (6.69) 
Income 0.13a - 0.01 0.05c - 0.012 
(3.03) (0.82) (1.96) (1.29) 
Education - 81.27c - 17.22 
(1.69) (1.14) 
Metro - 3.91 - 5.70 
(0.31) (0.76) 
Student - 154.23 - 133.97b 
(1.56) (2.23) 
State - 10.23 - 0.46 
(1.03) (0.07) 
Federal - 147.41 - 107.19c 
(1.61) (2.02) 
Schools 494 745.1b 110590.2 
(2.29) (0.91) 
Diversity 0.04 - 0.05 0.03 - 0.02 
(0.29) (1.19) (0.28) (0.72) 
Crime rate 1.19E-05b 0.0008 
(contemporaneous) (2.63) (0.33) 
Crime rate (1 year lag) 0.90a 1.11a 
(17.6) (27.8) 
Crime rate change 1.40E-05 0.009 
(three-year) (1.56) (1.38) 
Median age - 66.13 - 20.34 
(1.59) (0.91) 
Pop 18 ± 24 - 211.14b - 73.69 
(2.25) (1.19) 
Pop 25 ± 44 9.78 4.39 
(0.80) (0.17) 
Employee dominance 31 339.0a 28 543.2a 
(3.08) (4.09) 
Unemployment rate 2.14 - 35.4c 
(0.05) (1.71) 
Change in unemployment - 12.9 34.47c 
rate (three-year) (0.21) (1.55) 
Adjusted R2 0.62 0.70 0.95 0.73 0.70 0.97 
SEE 822.9 0.22 265.4 527.2 16.9 205.0 
F 9.60a 31.1a 110.4a 14.52a 28.8a 212.3a 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
Table 5. T SL S estimations of public primary and secondary education spending, total crime spending, and crime rate equations, percentage 
change between 1992 and 1985 
Total Corrections 
Variable 
Education 
spending 
(US$ per 
pupil) 
Crime 
spending 
(US$ per 
capita) 
Crime 
rate 
Education 
spending 
(US$ per 
pupil) 
Corrections 
spending 
(US$ per 
capita) 
Crime 
rate 
Constant 
Crime/correction 
spending 
Education spending 
Income 
Education 
Metro 
Student 
State 
Federal 
Schools 
Diversity 
Crime rate 
Crime rate (1 year lag) 
Crime rate change 
(three-year) 
Median age 
Pop 18 ± 24 
Pop 25 ± 44 
Employee dominance 
Unemployment rate 
Change in unemployment 
rate (three-year) 
Adjusted R2 
SEE 
F 
- 1.95 
(0.14) 
- 0.31b 
(2.42) 
0.03 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.36) 
- 0.10 
(0.65) 
- 0.90c 
(1.85) 
0.04 
(0.43) 
- 0.016 
(0.30) 
0.21 
(0.82) 
0.67c 
(1.89) 
0.34 
10.37 
4.67a 
52.18 
(8.85) 
0.53c 
(1.98) 
- 0.26 
(1.20) 
- 0.0002 
(0.15) 
1.26a 
(3.62) 
0.36 
17.05 
8.89a 
-
-
-
-
-
-
11.89 
(0.95) 
0.04 
(0.49) 
0.05 
(0.30) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.75a 
(9.78) 
1.08c 
(1.83) 
0.05 
(0.19) 
0.40 
(0.89) 
0.05 
(1.42) 
0.005 
(0.95) 
0.76 
6.16 
18.6a 
- 16.59b 
(2.08) 
0.08c 
(1.83) 
0.14 
(0.55) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
- 0.13 
(0.82) 
- 0.95c 
(2.00) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
- 0.07c 
(1.86) 
0.17 
(0.68) 
0.76b 
(2.20) 
0.38 
9.98 
4.70a 
52.81a 
(3.82) 
0.92 
(1.67) 
- 0.38 
(0.79) 
- 0.002 
(0.53) 
1.27a 
(4.63) 
0.37 
38.53 
8.46a 
-
-
-
-
-
17.15c 
(1.82) 
0.002 
(0.405) 
0.09 
(0.58) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.75a 
(9.74) 
1.22b 
(2.23) 
0.06 
(0.21) 
0.38 
(0.84) 
0.05 
(1.44) 
0.007 
(1.59) 
0.76 
6.18 
18.4a 
t-statistics below estimated coe� cients.
 
a, b, c signi® cance at 1, 5, 10% levels (2-tailed tests) or greater.
 
crime rate (positive) and median age (positive) as signi® cant 
in¯ uences. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
Estimation of our models suggests no evidence that crime­
related programmes have crowded-out spending on educa­
tion in 1992, 1985, or between the period 1985± 92 at the 
level of state and local governments. However, our empiri­
cal analysis provides strong support for a positive relation­
ship between these areas of public spending. In other words, 
b`ig’ spenders on education tended to be b`ig’ spenders on 
crime as well because those states that allocated relatively 
large levels of resources to one programme also allocated 
a relatively large level of resources to the other programme. 
Moreover, when spending on correctional programmes is 
substituted for total spending on crime, this same result 
appears in most cases as well: those states with relatively 
high resource commitments to education programmes 
also provide relatively high resource commitments to 
correctional programmes. These results indicate that 
spending decisions on these programmes do not arise 
within an environment of a zero-sum game; i.e., a spending 
increase in one programme is not funded by decreasing 
funding commitment to the other programme. Rather, in­
creases in either of these programmes are funded through 
either reductions in other programmes, general tax in­
creases, or issuance of additional public debt. Which of 
these options appears most likely cannot be answered with­
in our paper’s framework and therefore remains an interest­
ing and open research issue. 
Another area for future research would be to examine 
what in¯ uence, if any, t`hree strikes’ laws may exert on 
education programmes. Because t`hree strikes’ laws are rela­
tively new, and have not been passed by all states, data are 
not readily available with which to examine the e� ects of 
such laws on education programmes. However, while it may 
be true that future relationships between spending on edu­
cation and crime-related programmesmay change into ones 
that are consistent with the crowding-out hypothesis, it 
should be noted that the empirical evidence presented here 
is consistent with the previous literature and o� ers no sup­
port for the hypothesis that any particular spending pro­
gramme crowds-out any other spending programme of state 
or local governments. 
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